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BELHAS V. YA'ALON:
THE CASE FOR A JUS COGENS EXCEPTION TO THE
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
Graham Ogilvy*

INTRODUCTION

In Belhas v. Ya'alon, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed the complaint brought against General Moshe Ya'alon, a retired
Israeli general, on the grounds that any potential international law violations
committed by General Ya'alon occurred while he was acting in his official
capacity with the Israeli military. The alleged violations included war crime,
extrajudicial killings, crimes against humanity, and torture. Taking for granted
the details alleged in the complaint, General Ya'alon's actions constituted
serious jus cogens violations. Despite the severity of these violations, the court
held that General Ya'alon's position in the Israeli military made him immune
from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. This note will argue
that, due to the nature of jus cogens norms and the standing they hold in the
international community, the court should have found and applied a jus cogens
exception to the immunity provided by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
I. BELHAS V. YA'ALON: FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Saadallah Belhas and other plaintiffs brought an appeal before the
District of Columbia Circuit Court after their claims were dismissed in the
district court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of sovereign
immunity claimed by the defendant Moshe Ya'alon, an Israeli General, under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA").' The plaintiffs brought their

* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Hofstra University School of Law. First of all I would like to thank Morgan
McCord, my Notes and Comments Editor, and Elizabeth Streelman, Senior Editor for Articles, for
helping to edit and prepare this note for publication. I would also like to thank the rest of the senior
staff of the Journalof InternationalBusiness and Law for their support, and Professor Curtis Pew
for serving as my faculty advisor. Finally, I would like to thank my family for providing the
support and encouragement that has been so vital to my law school career.
Belhas v. Ya'alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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claims pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA") and the Torture
Victims Protection Act ("TVPA"), alleging that General Ya'alon was guilty of
"war crimes, extrajudicial killing, crimes against humanity, and cruel, inhumane
or degrading treatment or punishment". 2
From 1995 through 1998, General Ya'alon was the Head of Army
Intelligence for the Israeli Defense Forces ("IDF").3 He has since retired.4 In
1996, IDF's Northern Command launched "Operation Grapes of Wrath", a
campaign designed to encourage the Lebanese government to confront and
disarm factions of the terrorist group Hezbollah, which was operating in
southern Lebanon. 5 At the outset of the operation, the IDF issued radio
warnings to civilians unaffiliated with Hezbollah to leave in order to prevent
them from being falsely identified as members of the organization and targeted
during the conflict. 6 Rather than leave southern Lebanon, many civilians
instead decided to take refuge in a United Nations compound in the city of
Qana.7 The plaintiffs allege that, while under the command of General Ya'alon,
IDF helicopters attacked the town, including the U.N. compound, leading to the
injury or death of more than one hundred civilians. 8 The plaintiffs further
allege that General Ya'alon took no action to prevent the injuries and deaths
that occurred. 9 The plaintiffs, who are relatives of the injured and the deceased,
brought this claim in U.S. District Court as a result, arguing that the conduct of
General Ya'alon was inhuman and constituted an act of torture. 10
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. District of Columbia District Court
The plaintiffs brought their claim in the District Court for the District
of Columbia under the ATCA.11 In response, General Ya'alon moved for

id.

2

3 Id. at 1281.
4 Id.
5id.

Id. at 1282.

6

7id.

8Id.
9 Id.
0

Id. at 1282.

I11d.
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dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' 2 He argued that because his
actions, regardless of whether they constituted torture or any other human rights
offense, occurred during the course of his official duties as head of the IDF, he3
was immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA").'
In support of his motion, the Israeli ambassador wrote a letter to the United
States Department of State confirming that General Ya'alon acted within his
official capacities.' 4 The District Court agreed and dismissed the case, holding
that Ya'alon was immune from suit because none of the exceptions to sovereign
immunity under the FSIA had been met.' 5 Belhas and the other plaintiffs
appealed the decision to the D.C. Circuit Court.
B. Court of Appeals
The court of appeals began by discussing whether or not Ya'alon's
conduct indeed fell within his official capacity as the Head of Army
Intelligence. The court found that none of his actions were outside the scope of
16
his official duties, in part by relying on the letter from the Israeli ambassador.
Without looking at the FSIA's exceptions, the court held that Ya'alon qualified
for immunity under the statute.' 7 The thrust of the plaintiffs' appeal, however,
claimed that the nature of General Ya'alon's conduct created an exception to
the FSIA, and as a result,
the district court did have subject matter jurisdiction
8
over the torture claim.'
C. Jus Cogens Violations as Possible Exceptions to Sovereign Immunity
Under the FSIA
The plaintiffs contended that if General Ya'alon's actions constituted
jus cogens violations, the court should create an exception to the immunity
provided by the FSIA.' 9 The court rejected the contention that a violation of a
jus cogens norm is enough to create an exception to the FSIA, regardless of
whether General Ya'alon was responsible for committing human rights

12

Id.

13 Id.
14

id.

[5 Id.

16 Id. at

'8

1283.

ld. at 1282.
I7
Id. at 1286.

19 Id.
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violations in attacking the Lebanese compound. 20 Instead, the court found that
the FSIA provided the only way for the U.S. district courts to obtain subject
matter jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign.21 Moreover, the court held that
unless the FSIA explicitly provided an exception to immunity, no exception
exists. 2 Because there is no enumerated jus cogens exception in the FSIA, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument.
D. The Torture Victims Protection Act as a Possible Exception to the FSIA
The plaintiffs also argued that the TVPA establishes personal liability
for acts of torture committed under the actual or apparent authority of foreign
law despite the provisions of the FSIA.23 The court disagreed and found that,
while the TVPA may appear to grant subject matter jurisdiction over any
defendant when torture claims are involved, it does not constitute an exception
to sovereign immunity independent from those listed in the Act.24 The court
held that because the TVPA can still be applied to foreign officials when their
conduct falls under one of the FSIA's exceptions, because of precedent to the
contrary, and because the legislative history explicitly rejects a TVPA exception
to the FSIA, that no independent exception is created by the Act. 25
E. Miscellaneous Arguments Asserted by the Plaintiffs
The plaintiffs make two additional arguments in favor of the idea that
General Ya'alon should not receive immunity under the FSIA. Neither of these
arguments will be discussed any further in this note, and are mentioned here
only to accurately represent the claims made by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs
argue that because General Ya'alon had retired from the IDF before the suit
began, that he should no longer receive FSIA immunity.26 Plaintiffs also argued
that because they are seeking relief from General Ya'alon and not from the
sovereign, that he should not be protected by the FSIA.27 The court dismissed
both of these arguments rather quickly and instead focused on the arguments for
jus cogens and TVPA exceptions.

20

Id. at 1287.

21

23

id.
id.
Id. at 1288.

24

id.

22

1288-89.
Id. at 1284.

2 Id. at
26

27 id.
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III.

THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN

A. The Development of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act from the
Alien Tort Claims Act
The plaintiffs in Belhas v. Ya'alon brought suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia under the ATCA, which allows
subjects of foreign states to bring claims in U.S. district courts for violations of
international law.28 Specifically, the plaintiffs brought suit under the TVPA,
which makes anyone who commits an act of torture or an extrajudicial killing
liable to the victim or to the legal representative of the victim. 29 The TVPA,
which was added to the ATCA in 1991, modifies the ATCA, making
individuals who commit acts of torture under the color of foreign law liable in
U.S. district court.3 0 The FSIA, on the other hand, provides that foreign
sovereign states or "an agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state is immune3
from suit in U.S. district court unless certain enumerated exceptions are met. '
It may appear that the TVPA abrogates the FSIA, first, because it makes
individuals who act under the color of foreign law liable for their actions, and
secondly, because the ATCA appears to permit suit against foreign states and
their agents. Despite these interpretations, courts have consistently held that
neither the ACTA nor the TVPA provide the basis for U.S. courts to exercise
their jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns where there is no explicit FSIA
exception. 32
B. Amerada Hess and Exceptions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
In 1989 the Supreme Court held in Argentine Republic v. Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp., that the FSIA's exceptions to sovereign immunity

28

Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2008) ("The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States").
29Torture Victims Protection Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (note) sec. 2(a) (2008) (" (a) Liability--An
individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation--(I)
subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or(2)
subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the
individual's legal representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful
death").
30Alien Tort Claims Act § 1350.
3' Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act §§ 1603; 1605.
32Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 1605; Torture Victims Protection Act § 1350.
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provided the only basis for subject matter jurisdiction in U.S. courts over
sovereign states. 33 This case, which did not involve jus cogens violations, has
become a principle case in subsequent judicial decisions holding that such
violations fail to provide an exception to the FSIA.34
United Carriers entered into a charter party contract with Amerada
Hess Shipping to transport crude oil from Alaska to Amerada's refineries in the
U.S. Virgin Islands. 35 At the time, Great Britain and Argentina were fighting
over the Falkland Islands at the tip of South America.36 While in international
waters, about five hundred miles from the Falkland Islands, an Argentinean
bomber began to circle the ship and eventually attacked, causing extensive
damage. 37 As a result of the damage, United Carriers and Amerada Hess
brought suit against Argentina under the ATCA in the Southern District of New
York. 38 The case was dismissed in district court because of the FSIA. 39 The
court found no exception in the Act to allow for the court to exercise
jurisdiction over the claims. This decision was overturned by the court of
appeals, and that decision was appealed by Argentina to the Supreme Court.4 °
The Second Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and
refused to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims because it found that the FSIA was not
meant to "eliminate 'existing remedies in United States courts for violations of
international law' by foreign states under the Alien Tort Statute". 4' The court of
appeals felt that because Congress did not repeal the ATCA when the FSIA was
passed, and because much of the FSIA is focused on commercial concerns, that
the remedies available under the ATCA were still available after the passage of
the FSIA.42
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments on multiple grounds.
First of all, the Court found that "the text and structure of the FSIA
demonstrate[d] Congress' intention that the FSIA be the sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts' .43 Because the act set out when a
,,

33 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1988).
34 See Belhas v. Ya'alon, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany,

26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.3d 699 (9th Cir.
1992).
35 Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. at 431.
36

id.

37 Id.

at 432.

38 id.
39 Id. at

433.

40Id.
41 Id. (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987)).
42

ld. at 435.

43 Id. at 434.
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foreign state is immune from suit, as well as the specific instances when it could
not obtain immunity, the court found the statute contained the only grounds for
finding exceptions to sovereign immunity. 44 Additionally, the court was
unconvinced by the argument that because the ATCA was not repealed, that the
causes of action it previously permitted remained intact.45 The ATCA could be
interpreted so as to grant jurisdiction over foreign, non-sovereign defendants,
while the FSIA conferred jurisdiction over foreign states. 46 The court found no
reason then, especially when taking the language of the FSIA into account, to
agree with the circuit court a7 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the FSIA
provided the sole basis for exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign in a U.S. district court.
IV. JUS COGENS VIOLATIONS AND THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT

A. The Prohibition Against Official Torture has Reached the Level of a Jus
Cogens Norm
The plaintiffs in Belhas v. Ya'alon argued that the attack on the U.N.
compound, which caused the deaths and injuries of hundreds of Lebanese
civilians, amounted to torture, and therefore, the violation of a peremptory
norm.4 8 The plaintiffs further contend that such a violation of a peremptory
norm creates an exception to the sovereign immunity provided by the FSIA. a 9
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna
Convention"), "a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as
a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only
by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character". 50
Jus cogens norms are similar to customary international law, which operates

44 Id. at 434-35.
41 Id. at 436.
46

Id. at 437.

47 The court in Belhas v. Ya 'alon uses a similar analysis to come to the conclusion that the causes of

action available under the TVPA are limited by the FSIA. This will be discussed in more detail in a
later section of this note.
48 Belhas v. Ya'alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
49

id.

50

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332 [hereinafter

Vienna Convention].
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based on the consent of states. 5
As a result, states that object to an
international customary norm will not be bound as a matter of international
law. 52 Jus cogens norms, to the contrary, do not depend on the consent of
states.53 They are considered universal, fundamental norms of the international
community that "transcend ... consent" .

4

All states must accept and followjus

cogens norms regardless of objection. Because of the universal nature of jus
cogens norms, they occupy the "highest status in international law" and can be
preempted only by otherjus cogens norms.55
In Belhas v. Ya'alon, the plaintiffs argued that the prohibition against
torture has reached the level of a jus cogens norm, and as such, universally
prohibited by international law. 56 The Nuremberg trials following World War II
outlined many crimes that have traditionally been held to be violations of jus
cogens norms; genocide, enslavement, and other inhuman acts were found to be
so offensive to the human condition, they subjected the Nuremberg defendants
to the jurisdiction of the court regardless of Germany's assent to the authority of
the tribunal.57 U.S. courts, as well as international treaties, have long
recognized the prohibition against torture as part of customary international law,
and have since come to consider it a peremptory norm. 58 The court in
Committee of U.S. Citizens of Nicaragua v. Reagan announced that the
prohibition against torture had reached the level of a jus cogens norm. 59 In
Siderman v. Argentina, the court found that "[g]iven this extraordinary
consensus, we conclude that the right to be free from official torture is
fundamental and universal, a right deserving of the highest status under
international law, a norm of jus cogens".60 In light of these holdings, if the
actions of General Ya'alon did indeed rise to the level of torture, he violated a

51 Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.3d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992).
52

Id.

53 Id.
5

id.

55 Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988);

Siderman, 965 F.3d at 715.
56 Belhas, 515 F.3d at 1287.
57 Siderman, 965 F.3d at 715 (citing Steven Fogelman, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled
Promise,63 S. CAL. L. REV. 833, 847 (1990); Belsky, Merva & Roht-Arriaza, Implied Waiver
Under the FSIA: A ProposedException to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of

InternationalLaw, 77 CAL. L. REV. 365, 385-86 (1989)).
58 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.Supp. 1531
(N.D. Cal. 1987); The Treaty Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984).
59 Reagan, 859 F.2d at 941-42.
60 Siderman 965 F.3d at 717.
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jus cogens norm.
B. Jus Cogens Violations are Never Part of an Individual's Official State
Duties, and so They are not Entitled to Sovereign Immunity
The FSIA's definition of a foreign state includes any "agency or
instrumentality of [that] foreign state", and the Act extends immunity to such
agents as if they were the state themselves. 6 1 Thus, in order for General
Ya'alon to be immune from suit, he must have acted as an agent or
instrumentality of Israel, which would require that his actions be of an official
nature. This is precisely what Ya'alon claimed, and in support of this position,
the Israeli ambassador asserted that Ya'alon's actions fell within his official
duties as a general of the IDF. 62 Because the court agreed that Ya'alon had
acted in his official capacity, it declined to consider whether his actions
constituted war crimes, extrajudicial killings, or various other human rights
abuses. 63
By refusing to examine whether General Ya'alon's actions
constituted jus cogens violations because of his status as a state official, the
court begged the question, as growing jurisprudence has held that serious
human right abuses can never be official acts of a state.
International courts and tribunals have increasingly asserted that
human rights violations committed by state officials are not legitimate acts of
state. In 1993, the United Nations established the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in order to prosecute individuals for war
crimes committed in the Balkan nation. 64 In Prosecutorv. Furundzija,the court
stated that international prohibitions of certain crimes against humanity, in this
case torture, "first and foremost address themselves to individuals, in particular
State officials" and that "those who engage in torture are personably
accountable at the criminal level for such acts".65 Acts of torture and other
human rights violations, according to the court's reasoning, can never be part of
an individual's official duties as an agent of the state. This idea of individual
liability was subsequently echoed in the charter of the International Criminal

"' Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(a) (2008).
62 Belhas v. Ya'alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
61 Id. at 1283 ("Indeed, the Court noted in the complaint indicates that General Ya'alon took part in
any events related to the shelling of Qana that were outside his official authority and role as the
head of intelligence for the IDF.").
64 About the ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sections/AboutthelCTY (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
65Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 140 (Dec. 10, 1998). While the
case and selected quote deal with criminal, rather than civil, liability, this may simply be a function
of the nature of the tribunal. It nevertheless stands for the proposition that officials who engage in
torture are individually liable for their actions.
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and has been a part of international law as early as the
Tribunal for Rwanda,
66
Nuremberg trials.

Courts in the United States have also expressed the idea that conduct
by state officials in violation of international human rights norms is not part of
an official's duties as an agent of the state. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the
defendant Pena, the Inspector General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay, was
accused of kidnapping and torture.67 On appeal, Pena argued that he was
immune from suit because his actions were undertaken as an official of the
Paraguayan government. 68 The court declined to rule on the issue because Pena
had not made the argument in the lower court, however, it did state that they
"doubt whether action by a state official in violation of the Constitution and
laws of the Republic of Paraguay, and wholly unratified by that nation's
government, could properly be characterized as an act of state". 69 Earlier in the
decision, the court recognized that when Paraguay enacted its constitution it
"[was] bound both to observe and construe the accepted norms of international
law", thereby incorporating the law of nations into its own laws.70 By violating
the international prohibition against torture, Pena had acted contrary to the laws
of the republic of Paraguay. As a result, his actions could not properly have
been called acts of the state, and therefore he was liable as an individual and not
entitled to the immunity granted to agents of a sovereign. In Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos, the Ninth Circuit declined to extend immunity under the FSIA to the
Venezuelan head of state because his actions "were not acts of Venezuelan
sovereignty.... They constituted common crimes committed by the Chief of
State done in violation of his position and not in pursuance of it". 7 t Even more
law does
succinctly, in Siderman v. Argentina, the court stated: "International
72
not recognize an act that violates jus cogens as a sovereign act.
If a jus cogens violation can never be a sovereign act, then prior to any
66 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1January 1994 and 31 December 1994,
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Furundzija, 140 (quoting Trials of the Major
War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Vol. I, p. 223) ("Crimes against
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals
who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced").
67Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
61 Id. at 889.
69 id.

Id. at 877.
7' Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Jimenez v. Aristeguita, 311
F.2d 547, 557-58 (5th Cir. 1962)).
72Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.3d 699, 719 (9th Cir. 1992).
70

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol8/iss1/10

10

Ogilvy: Belhas v. Ya'Alon: The Case for a Jus Cogens Exception to the For
BELHAS V. YA'ALON

decision on whether an individual was acting in an official capacity, courts must
ask whether a violation has occurred. Otherwise a court would take an
individual's official status for granted without any real inquiry. If an official
violates a jus cogens norm, they cannot be acting as an agent of the state. As
such, they are no longer immune from liability as agents of the sovereign under
the FSIA, but rather, they become liable as individuals for the alleged conduct.
In Belhas v. Ya'alon, the court found that General Ya'alon was acting
in his official capacity in part because the conduct alleged in the complaint was
not personal or private in nature because of his position as the Head of Army
Intelligence of the IDF.73 But as the above examples point out, state courts
cannot assume that officials are acting in their official capacity simply because
they acted from their official position within the state. Because the court
declined to examine whether or not Ya'alon's conduct constituted the crimes
alleged in the complaint, it did not adequately determine if he acted in his
official capacity. If he had acted in violation of internationally recognized
human rights norms his actions could not have been considered acts of the
sovereign. By refusing to determine whether Ya'alon had violated jus cogens
norms, the court took for granted that he was acting in his official capacity
rather than examining the issue. The Belhas court also gives weight to the
74
Israeli ambassador's averment that Ya'alon acted in his official capacity.
While the statements of the foreign state may be useful, such statements do not
alter the nature of the conduct. Statements from a foreign state cannot make a
jus cogens violation into anything less than it is. Assuming Ya'alon's conduct,
even though undertaken as an officer of the IDF, did constitute jus cogens
violations, it could not have been part of his official duties. As such, he was not
acting as an agent of Israel and therefore was not entitled to immunity under the
FSIA.
C. There Should Be a Jus Cogens Exception to the FSIA
Even if such violations are considered official acts of a sovereign state,
jus cogens violations should create an exception to the FSIA. Jus cogens norms
75
can only be preempted by other international norms of comparable weight.
While sovereign immunity is internationally recognized, it does, by the very
nature of jus cogens norms, constitute one. As such, immunity cannot preempt
ajus cogens norm. Even if the Belhas court was correct in holding that General
Ya'alon acted in his official capacity, he should not be immune from suit under
73 Beihas v. Ya'alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
74 id.

75 Siderman, 965 F.3d at 715.
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the FSIA because of the particularly heinous nature of his alleged conduct.
Underthe Vienna Convention, jus cogens norms can be modified or
preempted "only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character". 76 While sovereign immunity may be domestically codified,
courts have held that sovereignty and sovereign immunity are principles of
international law.77
As principles of international law, sovereignty and
sovereign immunity can only modify jus cogens norms if they are, as a matter
of international law, of the same character as other peremptory norms; that is,
they must be peremptory norms themselves.
Sovereign immunity is not a jus cogens norm. While the Vienna
Convention declined to elaborate on just what were considered to be jus cogens
norms, "there is wide agreement on past and current jus cogens norms". 78 The
Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law includes genocide, slavery and the
slave trade, the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged arbitrary
detention, and systematic racial discrimination as prohibited jus cogens
violations. 79 Jus cogens norms prohibit "acts that the laws of all civilized
nations define as criminal". 8 ° While the Restatement's list is not exhaustive, it
illustrates the types of crimes prohibited as violations of jus cogens norms. Jus
cogens norms protect universally observed, fundamental human rights. In
particular, they prohibit the type of conduct viewed as the most abusive of
human rights and dignity. Sovereign immunity is simply not an intemational
legal principle of this character. A violation of sovereign immunity cannot be
equated with slavery or genocide. Sovereign immunity is not a human rights
issue. For this reason, the principles of sovereignty and sovereign immunity are
not jus cogens norms.
Additionally, jus cogens norms differ from other rules of international
law in that there can be no derogation from adhering to them. 8' United States
courts have recognized the mandatory nature of jus cogens norms. In Siderman
v. Argentina, the court stated that "[whereas] customary international law
derives solely from the consent of states, the fundamental and universal norms
constituting jus cogens transcend such consent, as exemplified by the theories
underlying the judgments of the Nuremberg tribunals following World War

76 Vienna Convention, supra note 50, art. 53.
77 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1981).
78 Lyn Beth Neylon & Karen Parker, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 411,429 (1989).
79 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 702 (1987).

goSiderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992).
s Vienna Convention, supra note 42, art. 53.
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In contrast to the mandatory nature of peremptory norms, sovereign
immunity is far from universally practiced as a mandatory feature of
international law. In fact, states frequently consent to waive immunity.
For example, the United States has consented to being sued by U.S.
citizens. 83 Without the consent of the United States to be named as a defendant,
it would enjoy sovereign immunity even against its own citizens. 84 States have
also waived sovereign immunity and submitted to the jurisdiction of various
international courts. Article 27 of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, for example, states:
1,,.

1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official
capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a
government official shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute...

2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to
the official capacity of a person, whether under national or
international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its
85
jurisdiction over such a person.
Because the FSIA defines a foreign state to include agents and instrumentalities
of the state, by consenting to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
("ICC") over officials, including heads of state, any state that ratifies the
convention would be, in effect, waiving its sovereign immunity, at least with
respect to the offenses covered by the Convention. 86 If sovereign immunity
were a peremptory norm of international law, this article of the Rome Statute
would violate the Vienna convention, since any treaty in derogation of a
preemptory norm is unenforceable. 87 A treaty allowing for the waiver of
sovereign immunity would result in a derogation of such a norm. 88 Because
states are allowed to freely waive their sovereign immunity, it cannot be a jus

82

Siderman, 965 F.3d at 715.

"3 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (2008).
84 Id.
85 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 27, July 17, 1998 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
86 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1603(a) & (b)(1) (2008).
87 Vienna Convention, supra note 50, art. 53.
88 Id.
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cogens norm.
States also deny sovereign immunity to other states without their
consent. The FSIA, while recognizing a foreign state's immunity from suit in
89
United States courts generally, also contains exceptions to that immunity.
These exceptions outline the circumstances in which the United States has
decided to unilaterally deny sovereign immunity to a foreign state. Becausejus
cogens norms are based on "values taken to be fundamental by the international
community", rather than the consent of nations, a state would not be permitted
to ignore jus cogens norms. 90 A state cannot create exceptions to jus cogens
norms as the FSIA does with sovereign immunity. This represents a
fundamental difference between sovereign immunity and jus cogens norms.
Because sovereign immunity is an international law principle that is
not comparable in character to jus cogens norms, international prohibitions
against grave human rights abuses should not be preempted by concerns over
state sovereignty. United States federal courts, however, have not recognized a
jus cogens exception to the FSIA. 9' In Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany,
the court refused to hear a case brought by Hugo Princz, a United States citizen,
against Germany for his treatment in Nazi concentration camps during World
War 11.92 Princz had been captured while visiting Slovakia and subsequently
turned over to the SS. 9 3 After he was liberated by American soldiers following
the war, Princz sought reparations from Germany with the support of the United
States government. 94 His requests were routinely denied, largely because he
was not a German citizen. 95 As a last resort, Princz brought suit against
Germany in federal district court.9 6

The lower court found that it did have

subject matter jurisdiction over the case, stating that the FSIA "has no role to
play where the claims alleged involve undisputed acts of barbarism committed
by a one-time outlaw nation which demonstrated callous disrespect for the
humanity of an American citizen, simply because he was Jewish".97 The circuit
court overruled the lower court's finding of subject matter jurisdiction, finding
no jus cogens exception to sovereign immunity within the FSIA. 98 The court
89

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 1605.

90 A Theory for the Application of the Customary InternationalLaw of Human Rights by Domestic

Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 332, 351 (1988).
9 See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
92 Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
9 IId. at 1168.
94 id.

95 ld.
96 Id.

97 Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F.Supp. 22, 26 (D.D.C. 1992).
98 Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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relied on Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, finding the FSIA to be the "sole
basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court". 99

The

court also relied on the holding in Siderman v. Argentina which had previously
addressed the question of whether or not
jus cogens violations created a FSIA
°°
exception and found that they did not.
In Siderman v. Argentina, the plaintiffs sued Argentina for the torture
of Jose Siderman by members of the country's ruling military junta.'l l The
Sidermans claimed that Jose was taken one night by the Argentine military and
subsequently beaten and tortured for a week because he was Jewish. 0 2 After a
week of torture, Jose Siderman was driven to an isolated location and thrown
from the car.' 0 3 He was then ordered to leave Argentina.1 4 The Sidermans
argued that "when a state violates jus cogens, the cloak of immunity provided
by international law falls away, leaving the state amenable to suit'"
The court
responded that "[as] a matter of international law, the Sidermans' argument
carries much force".' 0 6 Nevertheless the court relied on Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess to hold that unless the FSIA provides an exception to sovereign
immunity, federal district courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over claims
brought against a foreign state.'0 7
The court arrived at this decision reluctantly. It acknowledged that
sovereign immunity "derives from international law" and that 'jus cogens
norms 'enjoy the highest status within international law'."' 0 8 The court implied
that it agreed with the Sidermans that jus cogens violations should create an
exception to the sovereign immunity provided by the FSIA, and seemed to find
to the contrary only out of deference to the ruling in Argentine Republic v.
09
Amerada Hess.1
But for the decision in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess,
99 Id. at 1169 (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439
(1988)).

1oo Id. at 1174 (citing Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.3d 699, 719 (9th Cir.
1992)).
'0' Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.3d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1992) (The Sidermans

were also suing for the expropriation by the junta of large amounts property, but these claims are
separate from the torture claims and will not be discussed.).
102

id.

103 id.
'0

Id.

'o5 Id. at 717.
106 id.
'07 Id. at 718-19.

108Id. at 718 (citing Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C.
Cir. 1988)).
'09 Id. ("Unfortunately, we do not write on a clean slate. We deal not only with customary
international law, but with an affirmative Act of Congress, the FSIA. We must interpret the FSIA
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the court would presumably have allowed the Sidermans to sue Argentina in
federal court. The court then pointed out that while the Amerada court dealt
with the issue of whether or not international law can create an exception to the
FSIA, the type of international law violation present in Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess was not the type of violation alleged by the Sidermans." ° In the
Amerada case, two Liberian plaintiffs attempted to sue Argentina for the
sinking of a crude oil tanker."' The Siderman court explained that:
In Amerada Hess, the Court had no occasion to consider acts
of torture or other violations of the peremptory norms of
international law, and such violations admittedly differ in
kind from transgressions of jus dispositivum, the norms
derived from international agreements or customary2
international law with which the Amerada Hess Court dealt." 1
When the Amerada court held that there are no exceptions to sovereign
immunity outside of those in the FSIA, it was not presented with the challenges
of balancing sovereign immunity against the severity of jus cogens violations.
While the Amerada court may indeed have decided the same way had it been
presented with a jus cogens violation, the Siderman court seems to suggest that
the serious human rights concerns inherent in jus cogens norms may have led
the Amerada court to decide differently. However, because the language of the
Amerada decision left no room for a jus cogens exception to the FSIA, the
Siderman court was forced to dismiss the Siderman's claims." 3 So while
United States courts have routinely held that jus cogens violations do not create
an exception to the FSIA, those decisions are based on a case, Argentine
l 4
Republic v. Amerada Hess, which does not involve jus cogens violations."
Despite its holding, Siderman v. Argentina recognizes the validity of the
argument in favor of ajus cogens exception to the FSIA, but was "foreclosed by
the Supreme Court's opinion" in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess from
recognizing such an exception.' 15
Additionally, jus cogens violations should create an exception to the
FSIA because, as the principle of peremptory norms has become more
important in the international community following the Nuremberg trials, the
through the prism of Amerada Hess.").
"0 Id. at 718-19.
11 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 431-32 (1988).
12 Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.3d 699, 718-19 (9th Cir. 1992).
"' id. at 719.
114Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. at 428; Siderman, 965 F.2d at 699.
115 Siderman, 965

F.2d at 713.
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importance
of the principles of sovereignty and sovereign immunity has
16
waned.'
The primitive legal order of classical international law with its
'loose, unorganized society of sovereign states' has been
replaced by an increasingly organized and interdependent
international community.
International society is now
characterized by an increasing volume of state cooperation in
matters of common concern. The result has been a decreased
emphasis on the classical notions of sovereignty in an 7effort to
foster cooperation among the community of nations."
Even the passage of the FSIA in 1976 itself represented a shift in the notion of
sovereignty. Before the mid-twentieth century, the United States had granted
foreign states almost complete sovereign immunity. 1 8 By the early twentieth
century, however, the restrictive theory of immunity began to take hold. 119
Under the restrictive theory, states enjoy immunity only for their public acts,
but not when states act privately; that is, when it engages in commerce.' 20 The
United States began to rely upon this theory of sovereign immunity in 1952, and
in 1976 it was codified in the FSIA.121 The development of jus cogens norms
has further restricted sovereignty by limiting the ability of states to act
unilaterally. 22 The twentieth century has seen an erosion of traditional notions
of sovereignty in favor of "cooperation among the community of nations". 123 In
the face of the increasing international concern about the types of human rights
issues embodied by jus cogens norms, the notion of sovereign immunity in the
case of jus cogens violations has become "outmoded". 24 This shift in the
balance between sovereign immunity and jus cogens violations can be seen
throughout the international community.

116Belsky, supra note 57, at 391-92 (citations omitted).
117

Id.

118 Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
119 Id.
120 id.
121 Id.

122Belsky, supra note 57, at 390 ("The very existence ofjus cogens limits 'state sovereignty in the
sense that the 'general will' of the international community of states takes precedence over the
individual wills of states to order their relation.' Thus, the concept that a sovereign is subject to no
restraints except those imposed by its own will is inconsistent with the definition ofjus cogens as
peremptory law.") (citation omitted).
123 Id. at 392.
'24Id. at 391.
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Article Six of the statute establishing the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), and Article Seven of the statute establishing the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), both state
that an individual's status as an official of the state, including the position of
Head of State, does not make that individual immune from liability. 25 Both
tribunals were established to prosecute individuals for human rights violations
such as genocide and torture. 126 Both tribunals refuse to grant sovereign
immunity to individuals who commit the exact types of crimes prohibited byjus
cogens norms. 127 Furthermore, in the case of the ICTY, it would have been
impossible for the state to waive its sovereign immunity because Yugoslavia
was no longer a state when the ICTY was established. 18 Not only do the
ratifying states recognize that state officials who commit jus cogens violations
are not entitled to sovereign immunity, but they granted the tribunal the
jurisdiction to prosecute states without their consent as well. Article 27 of the
Rome Statute establishing the ICC also declines to extend sovereign immunity
to state officials and Heads of State.129 While the Rome Statute only recently
came into force, as of July 2008, one hundred and eight nations have ratified the
conventlon. 130 This represents wide agreement in the international community
that serious human rights violators must be brought to justice, even if those
violators are state officials who, under traditional notions of sovereignty, would
be immune from prosecution. While the United States has not ratified the
Rome Statute, both the ICTR and ICTY were established by Security Council
resolutions and, as a permanent member of the Security Council, had the United
States objected to either resolution, they would not have passed., 3' On the
international level, even the United States, at least some degree, has recognized
the idea thatjus cogens norms preempt concerns over state sovereignty.
While the ICTR, ICTY and other international tribunals charged with
prosecuting human rights violations have criminal, rather than civil jurisdiction,

125

S.C. Res. 955, supra note 65, art. 6; Statue of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former

Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, art. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
126

id.

127 id.

128 Timeline of the breakup of Yugoslavia, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4997380.stm (last

visited Apr. 8, 2009) ("By 1992 the Yugoslav Federation was falling apart". Yugoslavia began
breaking up before the establishment of the ICTY in 1993).
129 Rome Statute, supra note 85, art. 27.
130About the establishment of the ICC, http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ICC+at+a+glance/Establishment+of+the+Court.htm (last
visited Apr. 4, 2009) (While the Rome Statute was passed in 1998 it did not come into effect until
2002, when it was ratified by sixty countries.).
'31 U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1; art. 27 para.
3.
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that jurisdiction applies likewise to civil matters like
the reasoning underlying
32
the Belhas case.'
The goals of criminal and tort law overlap[.] ... Although by
tort claims private parties may seek vindication of private
interests, judgments in these cases affirm much wider
interests manifested in the norms that the community is
prepared to enforce. Punishment and compensation represent
two distinct, but complementary, 33ways of condemning past,
and deterring future, wrongdoing.'
Allowing plaintiffs to sue in tort for jus cogens violations, then, promotes the
same goals as prosecuting human rights violators in international courts and
tribunals. If state officials can be held individually liable in criminal courts, it
does not make sense to deny their victims the right to recover from the
individuals who inflicted on them the worst types of human rights crimes.
In sum, the D.C. Circuit court in Belhas v. Ya'alon should have
recognized a jus cogens exception to the FSIA. Courts have consistently
recognized the definition of jus cogens found in the Vienna Convention, and
that sovereign immunity is a principle of international law. 134 Sovereign
immunity, then, can only preempt jus cogens norms if it is itself a jus cogens
norm, which it is not. Despite the Ninth Circuit's recognition that this argument
"carries much force", courts in the United States have consistently held that no
FSIA exception exists.' 35 These decisions are based on the Supreme Court's
decision in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, a case that did not itself deal
with jus cogens violations. The court's decision in Belhas v. Ya'alon, as a
result, contradicts the very idea of jus cogens norms. Furthermore, the court's
emphasis on the immunity provided by the FSIA is out of step with the
diminished importance of sovereign immunity in the international community in
the face of increasing human rights concerns. The Belhas court's decision was
then incorrect according to the recognized definition of jus cogens and

132 Donald

Francis Donavan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of UniversalCivil

Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT'L. L. 142, 154 (2006).
133 id.

Vienna Convention, supra note 50, art. 53; Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d
1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (The Court recognized the Vienna Convention's definition.); Siderman
de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.3d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1992) (The Court here also
recognized that definition.); Int'l Ass'n of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1981) (The Court found the sovereign immunity is a principal
of international law.).
135 Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.3d 699, 718 (9th Cir. 1992).
'34
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anachronistic according to international trends holding sovereigns liable for
human rights violations rather than granting them immunity.
D. States that Violate Jus Cogens Norms Waive Sovereign Immunity,
Creating an Exception within the Structure of the FSIA
Even if jus cogens violations do not create an exception to the
immunity provided by the FSIA, the act alone provides a mechanism for finding
federal court jurisdiction for the types of claims brought by the plaintiffs in
Belhas v. Ya'alon. According to Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, the
FSIA provides the sole basis for finding jurisdiction. 136 If a claim falls under
one of the Act's enumerated exceptions, a sovereign can no longer claim
immunity. 137 Section 1605(a)(1) provides that "a foreign state shall not be
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States or of the States
in any case in which the foreign state has waived its immunity explicitly or by
implication . . .,,.138 Foreign sovereigns who commit serious human rights
abuses have impliedly waived their immunity because of the severity of their
conduct, as well as universal abhorrence of such violations, thereby making
them amenable to suit within the framework of the FSIA. If General Ya'alon
did indeed commit the acts alleged in the complaint, those acts should have
been interpreted as a waiver of sovereign immunity, and the case should not
have been dismissed.
In Siderman v. Argentina, the court held that Argentina had waived its
right to immunity by availing itself of courts.' 39 Argentina sought to prosecute
the Sidermans for the sale of land that it alleged did not belong to them, and
used the American courts to try to serve them with process. 14 The sale of the
land was linked to expropriation claims made by the Sidermans that, in turn,
were linked to their torture claims.' 4 ' The court held that because "Argentina
has engaged our courts in the very course of activity for which the Sidermans

136

Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1988).

137 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605 (2008).
138 Id. at § 1605(a)(1).
131 Siderman, 965 F.3d at 722.
140

Id.

141 Id. (The Sidermans alleged that they owned a certain acreage of land and that the Argentine

government claimed they in fact owned less than they did by a significant amount. This is part of
the basis for their expropriation claims. When the Sidermans sold their land Argentine claimed the
fraudulently sold the land that Argentina took when it undervalued the amount of land they owned.
This was the basis of Argentina's claim against the Sidermans and the reason they availed
themselves of the American courts.).
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seek redress, it has waived its immunity as to that redress".1 42 Despite the
court's earlier holding that the alleged jus cogens violations did not provide a
basis for jurisdiction, the court allowed the Sidermans to pursue their torture
claims on this basis. 43 In its analysis, the court described some of the ways a
foreign sovereign can waive immunity. For example, where a state submits to
arbitration, agreed to the law of a foreign state, or where the state has filed a
response to a pleading, a foreign sovereign has waived its immunity.' n4 Where
the litigation revolves around a written agreement, as the facts in Siderman do
because of the sale of land, the central issue according to the court was whether
the sovereign envisioned the involvement of a foreign court.' 45 Despite the
court's description of the types of activities that constitute an implied waiver 1of
46
immunity, the full extent of what constitutes such a waiver is far from clear.
There are strong indications that what constitutes an implied waiver of
immunity extends beyond the situations described in Siderman v. Argentina.
for
The legislative history of the FSIA indicates that it intended
47
decisions made on implied waivers to be based on international law. 1
The House Report states that, "the central premise of the bill
is that decisions on claims by foreign states to sovereign
immunity are best made by the judiciary on the basis of a
statutory regime which incorporates standards recognized
The incorporation of
under international law" ...
international law . . . suggests that the implied waiver

provision should be read to include waivers implied by
operation of international law. 148
The FSIA's waiver exception does not, by its language, refer to an implied
waiver based on international legal norms, and it does not make clear what
actions carried out by a foreign state constitute an implied waiver either. But
because Congress intended the FSIA to be informed by international law, the
implied waiver exception should be interpreted in a way that brings the statute
into accord with international norms. Holding that a state waives its immunity

142

Id.

143 Id.
'44

Id. at 72 1.

145 Id.
14 Belsky, supra note 57, at 395 (citing Jeffery A. Blair & Karen E. M. ParkerComment, The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and International Human Rights Agreements: How They CoExist, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 71, 81 (1982)).

147id.
148

Id. at 397-98 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1487-94, at 14 (1976)).
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when it commits jus cogens violations would bring the FSIA into harmony with
those norms. This position, while in a dissenting opinion, has been expressed in
at least one federal court.
In Princz v. Germany, Judge Wald argued in his dissent that Germany
impliedly waived its sovereign immunity when it subjected Princz to the horrors
of the Holocaust. 149 As he points out, the forms of waiver mentioned by the
Siderman court are not exhaustive, and the legislative history of the FSIA does
not foreclose the possibility that jus cogens violations may create a waiver of
immunity.150 Wald also points out that Congress intended the FSIA to "create
'a statutory regime which incorporates standards recognized under international
law"'.'15 For this reason, Wald felt that the FSIA should be interpreted in a way
that reconciles the Act with international legal principles. 52 He concluded,
therefore, that the only way to bring the FSIA into harmony with international
standards is to hold that when a foreign sovereign commits jus cogens
53
violations, it waives its right to sovereign immunity under the FSIA.
In this way, jus cogens violations can create an exception to sovereign
immunity within the statutory scheme of the FSIA. The court's holding in
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess that the FSIA provides the sole basis for
jurisdiction over a sovereign, then, can be reconciled with international norms
condemning jus cogens violations. For this reason, jus cogens violations should
be construed as implied waivers of sovereign immunity and the plaintiffs in
Belhas v. Ya'alon should have been permitted to move forward with their case
against General Ya'alon.
E. Courts Should Recognize a Jus Cogens Exception Despite any Potential
Burdens Such an Exception would Impose on the Courts
There is also concern that allowing foreign sovereigns to be sued for
jus cogens violations would flood U.S. courts with foreign litigation. Both the
Belhas and Princz courts expressed this concern, noting that it may lead to a
"strain ... upon our courts". 15 4 Despite the worries of these courts, concerns
about increased litigation in the United States are likely overblown and, perhaps
more importantly, cannot be reconciled with the gravity of jus cogens

149 Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, dissenting).
50 Id. at 1183-84.

"~' Id. at 1183 (citing H.R. REP. No.. 1487-94, at 14 (1976)).
152 id.
153 Id.
154 Belhas v. Ya'alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Princz v. Federal Republic of
Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
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violations.
Creating a jus cogens exception to the FSIA is unlikely to lead to an
overly burdensome increase in the workload of the courts. First, only a small
class of acts are considered jus cogens norms. As set out in the Third
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, genocide, slavery and the slave trade,
the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention,
and systematic racial discrimination as prohibited as jus cogens violations.155
The FSIA would still provide immunity to foreign sovereigns for other torts and
suits, including violations of international norms that do not rise to the level of
jus cogens violations. Only the worst types of human rights abuses would
create an exception to immunity.
Second, the FSIA already permits United States courts to exercise
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns in a large number of cases. For example, in
addition to the exceptions for express and implied waiver of immunity, the
FSIA subjects foreign states to the jurisdiction of United States courts when
they engage in commercial activity. 156 By essentially codifying the restrictive
theory of sovereignty, allowing foreign states to be sued when they act
commercially as private entities, the FSIA allows United States courts to
exercise jurisdiction over what is undoubtedly a much larger class of cases than
is embodied in jus cogens norms. Congress nevertheless expressed in their
declaration of purpose that, allowing for such jurisdiction "would protect the
rights of foreign states and litigants in United States courts". 157 Permitting
foreign plaintiffs to sue in U.S. courts at all, then, indicates a willingness to
accept such litigation in order to protect some rights. The argument that
creating a jus cogens exception to the FSIA would be a burden on the courts,
then, is not by itself a forceful argument. All forms of litigation create work for
the courts. The harm of increased litigation must be weighed against the rights
that litigation would protect. Jus cogens norms by definition prohibit only the
worst kinds of human rights abuses, and therefore the most fundamental human
rights would be protected. When compared to the rights protected, then, the
potential for increased litigation is simply not a weighty enough concern.
The potential harm of increased litigation would also be mitigated by
the availability of alternate means of redress for the victims of jus cogens
violations. In Princz v. Germany, for example, before initiating litigation
against Germany, Princz repeatedly made requests, often with the support of the

155 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 702 (1987).
156

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605 (2008).

"5' Id. § 1602.
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United States government, for reparations. 158 While his requests were
unsuccessful, they illustrate that other forms of restitution besides resorting to
the courts are available in some circumstances. Additionally, simply because
the victims of jus cogens violations would be allowed to sue in United States
courts does not mean that all victims would sue here. Plaintiffs may choose to
sue in the courts of another nation, and United States courts would even be able59
to send cases to those courts under the principle of forum non conveniens.
Allowing United States courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign states in the
case of jus cogens violations does not mean that United States courts will
always be the proper forum forjus cogens cases. This would greatly reduce the
number of cases American courts would have to adjudicate if a jus cogens
exception to the FSIA were recognized. For this and the foregoing reasons, the
potential harm that would be caused by such an exception would be minor.
Finally, concerns over the increased strain on the courts that would
potentially result from a jus cogens FSIA exception are contrary to the very
notion of jus cogens. They are "nonderogable and enjoy the highest status
within international law". 60 They only prohibit activities that are universally
recognized as the worst type of human rights abuses. For this reason, they can
only be preempted by other jus cogens norms. Like sovereign immunity,
practical concerns over burdening the courts can only be superseded by jus
cogens norms, then, if they are of the same character. Mere practicality issues,
for this reason, cannot preempt jus cogens concerns. Jus cogens concerns must
therefore take precedence over the potential for increased litigation.
V. THE TORTURE

VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT AND THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITIES ACT

The plaintiffs in Belhas v. Ya'alon also brought suit under the TVPA,
arguing that where the TVPA applies, it supersedes the FSIA."6 The TVPA
provides that "[a]n individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color
of law, of any foreign nation subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil
action, be liable for damages to that individual". 162 They argued that, because
in order to be subject to the act, an individual must be acting under actual or
apparent authority of a foreign state, that foreign officials who commit acts of

158Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
'59 Belsky, supra note 57, at 406.
'60 Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
161Belhas v. Ya'alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
162The Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (note) sec.2 (2008).
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torture are liable under the act and are not entitled to FSIA immunity. 63 To
hold otherwise, they argued, would render the TVPA useless.' 64 The court
rejects this argument, and, for the following reasons, was correct in doing so.
The court first pointed out that the TVPA would not be nullified by
extending immunity to foreign officials under the FSIA.165 The FSIA would
still permit foreign officials to be sued under the FSIA where their actions are
not official acts, or where one of the FSIA's exceptions applies. 166 The court
next looked to the legislative history of the TVPA and found that Congress did
not intend for the act to create an exception to FSIA immunity. 67 In fact, as the
court pointed out, "[bloth the House and Senate reports on the passage of the
68
TVPA state explicitly that the TVPA is not meant to override the FSIA".1
Because granting immunity to foreign officials under the FSIA does not nullify
the TVPA, there is no reason to find that the TVPA creates an exception to the
FSIA. As this interpretation of the TVPA is additionally supported by the
legislative history, the court was correct in its ruling that no TVPA exception to
the FSIA exists.
VI. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW, BRIEF POLICY CONCERNS AND POSSIBLE
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

The decision in Belhas v. Ya'alon represents a recent example of
jurisprudence; standing for the fact that unless the FSIA provides for an explicit
exception to sovereign immunity, United States courts cannot exercise their
jurisdiction over foreign states and their agents. Earlier cases addressing the
issue, such as Siderman v. Argentina and Princz v. Germany, have held, like
Belhas v. Ya'alon, that there is no jus cogens exception to the FSIA. At the
Circuit court level, judges have routinely followed the decision in Amerada, and
the Supreme Court has denied certiori to cases where the argument for a jus
cogens exception is advanced.169 For this reason, absent a shift in American
policy towards issues of sovereignty and international legal standards, the
circuit courts appear unlikely to change their position on the matter.
Nevertheless, as the United States transitions from eight years of the Bush

161 Belhas, 515 F.3d at 1288.
164

id.

165 id.
'66
167

Id. at 1288-89.
id.

168

Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 5 (1991)).

169 Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992) (certiorari denied);

Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (certeriori denied).
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presidency to the Obama administration, the Belhas decision represents an
opportunity to revisit the issues raised by earlier cases in the faces of possible
changes in American international policy and in attitudes toward human rights
abuses.
In order to illustrate the likely policy differences between the Bush and
Obama administrations, it is useful to examine their positions regarding the
ICC. The Bush administration has been openly hostile toward the court. The
administration's central objection to the court was that it is a threat to the
sovereignty of the United States, and can be summed up by statements made by
John Bolton, who under the Bush administration served as interim
Representative to the United Nations, who stated that "[tihe ICC is an
organization that runs contrary to fundamental American precepts and basic
constitutional principles of popular sovereignty, checks and balances, and
national independence". 1 70 American objections to the ICC, then, are founded
on the same policy driving circuit court decisions which held that there is nojus
cogens exception to the FSIA. The Bush administration's policy toward the
court reflected the value placed on national sovereignty, even at the expense of
holding violators of the worst type of human rights abuses accountable for their
actions. There are indications, however, that this stance towards the court may
change under President Obama. While still a senator, Barack Obama was asked
whether he felt that the United States should ratify the Rome Statute. He
responded "Yes[.] The United States should cooperate with ICC investigations
in a way that reflects American sovereignty and promotes national security
interests". 71 Even though he expressed reservations about the role of national
sovereignty should the United States ratify the Rome Statute, his general
support of the ICC is a marked departure from the Bush administration's
opposition to the court. Hilary Clinton, who will play a pivotal role in shaping
United States foreign policy as Secretary of State, has also expressed a more
positive view of the ICC and concerns over the types of issues dealt with by the
court than the Bush administration.
There is broad support in this country across political and
ideological divides that perpetrators of genocide, mass
atrocities, and war crimes must be held accountable ...
Consistent with my overall policy of reintroducing the United

170

John Bolton, Under Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Sec., Address before the Federalist Society

at the National Lawyers Convention (Nov. 13, 2003), available at http://www.fedsoc.org/publications/PublD.58/pub-detail.asp.
171 Presidential Candidate Questionnaire of Barack Obama, Sen. IlI., (2004), available at
http://globalsolutions.org/politics/elections and-candidates/questionnaire/2004?id=20.
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States to the world, I will . . . evaluate the record of [ICC],
and reassess how we can best engage with this institution
and
172
hold the worst abusers of human rights to account.
The willingness of American officials to reexamine the role the ICC
has to play in bringing human rights violators to justice represents a possible
willingness to reexamine the types of issues raised by the Belhas case.
Ratification of the ICC would signal an acknowledgement that in the face of jus
cogens violations, at least some degree of national sovereignty should be
sacrificed. Such a change in policy could alter the views of politicians and
judges on the importance of immunity provided to foreign sovereigns under the
FSIA. While the ratification of the Rome Statute by the United States is not
definite, and anticipating the adoption of ajus cogens FSIA exception even less
certain, possible changes in American policy toward respecting international
norms at the very least make the issues raised by Belhas v. Ya'alon worth
reexamining. The shifts in United States policy which are necessary for the
creation of a jus cogens exception to the FSIA are increasingly possible as the
country transitions into the Obama administration.
CONCLUSION

The conclusion reached by the Belhas court that General Ya'alon
should not have received sovereign immunity for his actions, while in line with
prior decisions finding there to be no jus cogens exception to the FSIA, ignores
the non-derogable nature of those norms. Acknowledging a jus cogens
exception to sovereign immunity would bring the FSIA into accord with the
universal understanding of jus cogens norms, as well as international trends
limiting sovereignty in order to hold human rights violators liable for their
actions. While General Ya'alon's actions may not have in fact constituted jus
cogens violations, failing to even address the issue, and instead dismissing the
case because of the FSIA, this and previous courts have turned their backs on
the developing importance of human rights issues internationally, in favor of an
antiquated notion of foreign sovereignty. In order to remedy this, future courts
should recognize ajus cogens exception to the FSIA.

172 Presidential Candidate Questionnaire of Hilary Clinton, Sen. N.Y, (Nov. 12, 2007), available at
http://globalsolutions.org/08orbust/quotes/2007/11/27/quote6l5.
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